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NOTE 
The Right to Publicity After Death: Postmortem 
Personality Rights in Washington in the Wake of 
Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com 
Aubrie Hicks∗ 
“It’s funny how most people love the dead. Once you’re dead, 
you’re made for life.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
People have always been fascinated by fame. Many are drawn to 
celebrities, and more importantly, the money that often comes along with 
fame.2 Celebrities often come from humble beginnings and work for 
many years before they attain any level of notoriety or earn any signifi-
cant income. Accordingly, as the level of celebrity (and wealth) increas-
es, so does the need for protection. 
Celebrities and their capacity to earn money from their likeness are 
protected under the right of publicity or personality. The right of publici-
ty or personality refers to “the inherent right of every human being to 
control the commercial use of his or her identity.”3 As there is no federal-
ly protected right of publicity, each state has created its own protections 
for this intellectual property right.4 Generally, the right of publicity pro-
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 1. Jimi Hendrix; see JERRY HOPKINS, THE JIMI HENDRIX EXPERIENCE 9 (1993). 
 2. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 148−49 (1993). 
 3. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2011). 
 4. Id. 
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vides celebrities with legal protection in the form of a tort action, and 
allows them to retain control over the commercial use of their identity or 
persona.5 Under right of publicity doctrines, celebrities can bring an un-
fair competition claim against any individual who infringes this im-
portant intellectual property right.6 
While the states are fairly consistent in protecting the rights of liv-
ing individuals, the level of protection for deceased celebrities varies 
among the states.7 Some states allow the right to extend beyond death, 
while others refuse to recognize a postmortem right of publicity.8 Even 
among states that do recognize a postmortem right of publicity, the right 
is protected to varying degrees, with some states providing explicit statu-
tory protections and others providing only common law protections.9 
Given the inconsistencies among the states, the continuing right to 
publicity after death has been the subject of much litigation over the last 
few years, especially in light of the fact that many celebrities continue to 
earn vast amounts of money even after death.10 The most notable cases 
involve well-known celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, 
and Jimi Hendrix.11 In each case, the court refused to extend the right of 
publicity past death, denying intellectual property protections to each 
celebrity’s estate.12 
                                                 
 5. Id. § 1:3. “Persona” includes names, nicknames, voice, pictures, and performing style. Id. § 
4:46. 
 6. Id. § 1:3; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 7. John W. Branch, David H. Green & Karl A. Hefter, No Respect for the Dead: Protecting 
Deceased Celebrity Personality Rights, 76 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 678 (2008); see also 
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 nn.12−14 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that sixteen states recognize a postmortem right of publicity under statute or common law, 
while two states explicitly refuse to recognize a postmortem right of publicity). 
 8. See Herman Miller, Inc., 270 F.3d at 326 nn.12−14. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Kathy Heller, Deciding Who Cashes in on the Deceased Celebrity Business, 11 CHAP. 
L. REV. 545, 545 (2008) (“According to the annual list published by Forbes.com, the thirteen ‘Top 
Earning Dead Celebrities’ grossed a combined total of $232 million in twelve months ending Octo-
ber, 2007. The Forbes list is topped by the estate of Elvis Presley, which generated $49 million, and 
includes familiar names like Albert Einstein and John Lennon, as well as relative newcomers, such 
as the rapper, Tupac Shakur, and the ‘Godfather of Soul,’ James Brown. According to industry esti-
mates, ‘after Mr. Presley, Ms. Monroe and James Dean are the most valuable dead-celebrity 
brands.’”). 
 11. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Experi-
ence Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Elec. Hendrix, L.L.C., No. C07-0338 TSZ, 2008 WL 3243896 (W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 7, 2008); Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 12. See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 959 (“[H]eretofore, the law has always thought that 
leaving a good name to one’s children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual, famous or not. 
Commercialization of this virtue after death in the hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition 
and somehow seems contrary to the moral presuppositions of our culture.”); Shaw Family Archives, 
486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (“Thus, at the time of her death in 1962 Ms. Monroe did not have any post-
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Notably, litigation involving Jimi Hendrix’s personality rights led 
to the 2008 passage of the Washington Personality Rights Act (WPRA), 
which expanded the existing personality rights statutes to ensure that the 
rights were protected after death.13 As a result, Washington State was 
regarded as having the strongest statutory protection of personality rights 
for deceased individuals.14 But in February 2011, the District Court for 
the Western District of Washington held that the amendments to the 
Washington Personality Rights Act were unconstitutional.15 In his opin-
ion, Judge Thomas S. Zilly reasoned that the WPRA violated the Due 
Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant Commerce Clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution.16 
This Comment explores the development of publicity rights and 
states’ methods of protecting, or their failure to protect, the rights of de-
ceased celebrities. Part II provides background on celebrity rights in the 
United States and examines the evolution of rights in Washington State. 
Part III examines the district court’s decision in Experience Hendrix, 
L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd.17 Part IV offers suggestions for 
ways in which the Personality Rights Act can be amended to ensure the 
continuation of publicity rights after death without violating the Consti-
tution. Part V provides a summary and conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity ensures that an individual has the right to 
control the commercial exploitation of his or her name, picture, and like-
ness in connection with the sale, advertisement, or solicitation of prod-
ucts and merchandise.18 Courts originally recognized only a general 
common law right of privacy, which was extended to cover the use of a 
person’s identity.19 In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank introduced the idea of a 
“right of publicity” in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.20 By 2000, many states had provided statutory protections for the 
right of publicity.21 
                                                                                                             
mortem right of publicity under the law of any relevant state. As a result, any publicity rights she 
enjoyed during her lifetime were extinguished at her death by operation of law.”). 
 13. See H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
 14. Branch, Green, & Hefter, supra note 7, at 1. 
 15. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1140, 
1142 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 16. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140, 1142. 
 17. Id. at 1122. 
 18. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:3. 
 19. Id. § 1:4. 
 20. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that many prominent 
persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public 
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A. Discrepancies in Right of Publicity Protections Among the States 
Eleven states provide only a common law right of publicity, includ-
ing Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, and South Carolina.22 Nine-
teen other states have enacted statutory measures to further protect the 
right of publicity, most notably Washington, California, Tennessee, and 
Indiana.23 These states are notable because the statutory measures were 
enacted mostly for the protection of celebrities who live or lived in each 
state. For example, California’s publicity rights statute was enacted be-
cause “California has an overriding interest in safeguarding its citizens 
from the diminution in value of their names and likenesses, enhanced by 
California’s status as the center of the entertainment industry.”24 Similar-
ly, Tennessee enacted its Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984 in re-
sponse to litigation surrounding the estate of Elvis Presley.25 
Even among the states providing statutory protections, there is 
much variation in these laws. Some statutes were created in response to 
specific cases in which courts refused to recognize a right of publicity or 
privacy.26 Others were created “because other states had recently done so 
and it seemed the sensible thing to do.”27 Some statutes protect only a 
person’s name or likeness28 while others offer protection for a person’s 
name, likeness, photograph, and voice.29 
One of the main differences in each state’s statutory approach is the 
way in which the state protects (or declines to protect) postmortem pub-
licity rights. For example, California and Illinois both provide express 
postmortem statutory rights. While California offers protection for 70 
                                                                                                             
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for author-
izing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, 
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be 
made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.”); 
see also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:4. 
 21. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:4. 
 22. Brittany A. Adkins, Comment, Crying out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsisten-
cies in Right of Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 
499, 501 (2010). 
 23. Id. 
 24. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:22 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 
1202 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 25. Id. § 6:16. 
 26. Id. § 6:6. 
 27. Id. 
 28. These states include, for example, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Kentucky. MCCARTHY, 
supra note 3, § 6:8. 
 29. Examples of states offering at least one of these additional protections include California, 
Indiana, and Nevada. Id. 
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years after death, Illinois protects these rights for only 50 years.30 In con-
trast, states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island do not provide any ex-
plicit protection for postmortem rights in their statutes.31 
The conflicting treatment of postmortem publicity rights is due 
largely to the way each state views the right to publicity. Some states 
treat the right as a property right while others treat the right as a privacy 
right. As such, the differences in privacy laws and property laws lead to 
different outcomes in each state. 
1. Personality as a Privacy Right 
The concept of a “right of publicity” has its origins in privacy law.32 
Although the concept of privacy can have many different meanings, for 
the purposes of understanding rights of publicity, the following definition 
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court applies: 
[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy 
encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or 
her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not 
at one time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the 
protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on 
the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the ex-
tent to which the passage of time rendered it private.33 
The Supreme Court uses a broad definition of privacy, encompassing the 
right to control the use of information about one’s private self.34 This 
broad definition is especially important to celebrities because they stand 
to lose or gain income depending on the level of control they have over 
their publicity rights.35 
Courts have historically focused on the “indignity or mental trau-
ma” associated with the nonpermissive commercial use of someone’s 
identity.36 Many well-known celebrities brought suit for damages they 
suffered from the commercial use of their identity; however, these were 
usually monetary rather than psychological damages.37 Thus, the right of 
publicity developed into a commercial tort under unfair competition 
law.38 Several states (such as New York, Utah, and Wisconsin) classify 
                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 1:7. 
 33. Id. § 1:6 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 751 (1989)). 
 34. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:6. 
 35. See generally Madow, supra note 2. 
 36. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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the right of publicity as a privacy right.39 As such, the right is entirely 
personal and cannot survive after the individual dies.40 It belongs only to 
a living person and cannot be transferred to heirs.41 
In other states (such as Washington and Indiana), the right of pub-
licity is recognized as a property right that encompasses the same rights 
and attributes as tangible property.42 
2. Personality as a Property Right 
Like personal property, the personality right “can be possessed and 
controlled to the exclusion of others. Its economic benefits can be real-
ized and enjoyed. It can also be the subject of a contract and can be as-
signed to others.”43 As such, the right does not terminate at an individu-
al’s death and can be transferred to others, including heirs and entities.44 
Among states that recognize the right of publicity as a property 
right, most find jurisdiction in the celebrity’s domicile. This is due to the 
fact that courts have held that the economic harm that a celebrity suffers 
from the unauthorized use of his identity occurs in the state where the 
celebrity lives and where he or she headquarters his or her business.45 
Furthermore, the accepted means for managing the estate of a deceased 
individual is his or her domicile.46 Thus, when determining whether the 
right of publicity is included in the estate of a deceased celebrity, the tra-
ditional rule is to look to the law of the state where the individual is dom-
iciled at the time of death.47 Courts generally apply the law of the state in 
which the individual was domiciled to the entire estate to avoid creating 
conflicts by applying different states’ laws to each piece of property lo-
cated in that state.48 Establishing the domicile lends uniformity to ques-
tions of property law.49 The question of property distribution after death 
is determined by the location of the property at issue.50 As the “property” 
                                                 
 39. Id. § 6:8. 
 40. Alain J. Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford 
A Global Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 270 (2007). 
 41. Robert C. Cumbow, Protecting Your Image: Questioning Publicity Rights Law, WORLD 
TRADEMARK REV. Aug.–Sept. 2011, at 84. 
 42. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative 
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1227 (1986). 
 45. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:16. 
 46. Id. § 11:17. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity: Domicile as an Essen-
tial First Step, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1301, 1309 (2001). 
 50. Id. 
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at issue in a publicity rights case is the persona of the celebrity or indi-
vidual, it is important to determine where the person was domiciled at 
the time of death.51 This becomes especially important in cases like those 
involving Jimi Hendrix where a celebrity’s estate establishes domicile in 
one state, even though the celebrity was born in and lived in another 
state, and the celebrity died in a third state.52 
B. Development of the Right of Publicity in Washington State 
In 1998, the Washington State Legislature enacted the Personality 
Rights Act (the Act). The Act established a statutory basis for each per-
son’s right to the use of his name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness.53 The right was not limited to celebrities, but was established for 
each person, whether or not their identity was used commercially during 
their lifetime.54 The right was defined as a property right that is exclusive 
to the person during their lifetime and does not expire when they die.55 
The Act allowed the personality right to be transferred in a will or 
“by the laws of intestate succession.”56 The Act also provided that the 
right existed for a period of 75 years after death for a person whose iden-
tity has commercial value, or a personality.57 Deceased personalities 
were defined as “all such persons who have died since 1948.”58 
Finally, the Act created a right of action for damages against any 
person who uses a person’s identity (whether a personality or not) with-
out prior consent.59 The Act provided several exceptions for fair use, 
such as satire, literary or musical works, and magazine articles.60 The 
legislature passed the Act because, after several Washington cases in-
volving the estate of Jimi Hendrix, the legislature determined that the 
statute was lacking in its protections for postmortem publicity rights. 
1. Litigation Involving the Estate of Jimi Hendrix 
Jimi Hendrix died intestate in London in 1970.61 As Jimi had no 
wife or children, Hendrix’s father, Al Hendrix, was the sole heir to his 
                                                 
 51. Id. at 1313. 
 52. See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 
1127 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 53. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 1. 
 55. S.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. Id. 
 61. HARRY SHAPIRO & CAESAR GLEBBEEK, JIMI HENDRIX, ELECTRIC GYPSY 8 (1990). 
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estate.62 In 1995, Al Hendrix assigned his rights to the estate of Jimi 
Hendrix to two limited liability companies, Experience Hendrix and Au-
thentic Hendrix.63 In 2005, these assignees brought a right of publicity 
claim against Electric Hendrix in federal district court in Washington 
State.64 Judge Thomas Zilly dismissed the case, finding that, as Hendrix 
was domiciled in New York at the time of his death, New York law must 
apply to the case.65 New York law only recognizes the right of publicity 
in living persons; thus, no right of publicity descended to Al Hendrix at 
the time of Hendrix’s death.66 Because Al did not acquire Jimi Hendrix’s 
publicity rights, he could not assign or transfer them to Experience Hen-
drix and Authentic Hendrix. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion.67 The panel agreed that New York law (providing no posthumous 
right of publicity) applied to the case and therefore  affirmed the district 
court’s grant of partial summary judgment.68 
2. Amendments to the WPRA 
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Electric Hendrix decision,69 
Washington State Representative Pederson sponsored legislation seeking 
to amend the publicity rights statute. The legislature introduced House 
Bill 2727 in 2008 to strengthen the original Act passed ten years earlier.70 
Representative Pederson sought to tighten up the law to protect deceased 
personalities who died before 1998.71 Several other interested parties tes-
tified to the importance of ensuring that the right of publicity survived 
postmortem.72 All were concerned with clarifying the existing personali-
ty rights law to protect people who had organized their interests based on 
the existing law of personality rights.73 Discussions centered around the 
fact that the bill was especially important in Washington State due to the 
                                                 
 62. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 
(W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 63. See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., No. C03-3462Z, 2005 
WL 2922179, *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2005). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *3. 
 67. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 68. Id. at 740. 
 69. Id. at 739. 
 70. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2008). 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. S.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). Two notable figures who testified 
were Dave Green of Corbis and Karen Davis, an attorney who represented Experience Hendrix, 
LLC. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
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presence of Getty Images and Corbis, companies concerned with licens-
ing rights of publicity.74 
House Bill 2727 passed the House 94–0 and the Senate 46–0 and 
was signed into law by Governor Gregoire on March 19, 2008.75 The 
amended statute provided that in the State of Washington, the right of 
publicity continues after a person’s death without regard to where the 
person was domiciled when they died or whether the jurisdiction where 
the person was domiciled recognized a similar right at the time of 
death.76 The effect of the amended statute was to essentially create a na-
tional right of publicity claim for any plaintiff who was able to obtain 
personal jurisdiction in the state of Washington.77 
III. EXAMINATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S HOLDING 
In a series of cases concerning the estate of Jimi Hendrix, the court 
had determined that Jimi Hendrix was domiciled in New York when he 
died.78 Under New York law, Hendrix’s right of publicity did not survive 
at his death and was not passed to his father (his sole heir).79 
After the 2008 changes to the WPRA, the statute essentially served 
to allow the plaintiffs in the Experience Hendrix case to circumvent any 
issues arising from Hendrix being domiciled in New York. However, 
Judge Zilly objected to the amendments to the WPRA, finding them to 
be unconstitutional for several reasons. 
A. Background and Procedural Posture 
Al Hendrix assigned various rights to Experience Hendrix, includ-
ing the copyright for various songs and several federally registered 
trademarks.80 After the Washington legislature amended the WPRA in 
2008, Experience Hendrix brought action against HendrixLicensing.com, 
alleging that defendants violated the Lanham Act,81 the Washington 
                                                 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. 2008 House Bill 2727: Extending Personality Rights to a Deceased Person, WASH. VOTES, 
http://www.washingtonvotes.org/2008-HB-2727 (last visited July 1, 2012). 
 76. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
 77. See Phillip Barengolts, Amending a Washington State Statute to Ignore Choice of Law 
Principles Could Not Gain Jimi Hendrix’s Heirs a Post-Mortem Right of Publicity: Court Rules 
Amendment Unconstitutional, PATISHALL IP BLOG (March 31, 2011), http://www.pattishall.com/ 
pdf/3-31-11-Jimi_Hendrix_ROP_Case_Blog_Post.pdf. 
 78. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 79. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 80. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 
(W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 81. The Lanham Act is federal legislation that protects against trademark infringement, dilu-
tion, and false advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
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Consumer Protection Act, and state common law.82 Experience Hendrix 
also sought to prevent HendrixLicensing.com from using song titles, lyr-
ics, and renditions of Hendrix’s name.83 
After instituting the action, Experience Hendrix sent a letter to the 
defendant’s customers and issued a press release accusing the defendants 
of trademark infringement.84 Experience Hendrix then sought a prelimi-
nary injunction, which was denied in part, as the court concluded that the 
use of Hendrix’s name constituted fair use.85 The case came before the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on 
the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.86 The defendants 
additionally filed counterclaims, seeking a declaration that the 2008 
amendments to the WPRA do not apply to Jimi Hendrix.87 
Ultimately, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants as to their declaratory judgment counterclaim and de-
clared that the defendants were not constrained by any right of publicity 
from trading in images or likenesses of Jimi Hendrix. The court also de-
clared that the use of the names “Hendrix” and “Jimi Hendrix” constitut-
ed fair use.88 
Judge Zilly first addressed the issue of which state’s law to apply, 
pointing out that the language of the WPRA requires courts to apply 
Washington law without regard to the personality’s domicile at the time 
of death.89 Under the WPRA, the court would be required to reach a dif-
ferent result with regard to Jimi Hendrix’s postmortem right of publicity 
than the laws of New York would require.90 Thus, the court had to de-
termine whether the requirements of the WPRA were subject to constitu-
tional restrictions.91 
                                                 
 82. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1127−28. 
 83. Id. at 1128. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. “Fair use” is a First Amendment protection that encompasses uses of a person’s likeness 
in connection with news or public affairs. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:117. 
 86. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. 
 87. Id. at 1129. 
 88. Id. at 1143. 
 89. Id. at 1132−33 (“Unlike the original WPRA, the 2008 amendments contain a clear directive 
to apply the law of Washington. Indeed, the revised language appears to have been simply lifted 
from a Ninth Circuit opinion that suggests how to phrase a choice-of-law provision. Because the 
WPRA prescribes application of Washington law ‘regardless of place of domicile or place of domi-
cile at time of death,’ RCW 63.60.010, the issue before the Court is whether such legislative di-
rective is ‘subject to constitutional restrictions.’”). 
 90. Id. at 1132. 
 91. Id. 
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B. Constitutionality of the WPRA 
The court first took issue with the language in the Act referring to 
the individual’s domicile: 
The WPRA, as modified, does much more than impose liability for 
the unauthorized use “of a living or deceased individual’s or per-
sonality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, on or in 
goods, merchandise, or products entered into commerce in this 
state.” The WPRA purports to govern whether a right of publicity 
exists, whether it continues post-mortem, and how it may be trans-
ferred during life and after death, regardless of where the particular 
individual or personality is or was domiciled. In addition, although 
the WPRA requires that allegedly infringing goods, merchandise, or 
products enter into commerce in Washington, it does not contain a 
similar restriction concerning infringements occurring in the adver-
tising of goods or services or in fund-raising or solicitation of dona-
tions. Rather, the statute defines infringement as unauthorized use in 
advertising or fund-raising without regard to where such activities 
transpire, and then separately precludes the dissemination or publi-
cation of such advertisements within the State of Washington.92 
As such, the court stated that six specific provisions were unconsti-
tutional: (1) the fourth sentence of RCW 63.60.010 (“regardless of 
whether the law of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individ-
ual or personality at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar 
or identical property right”);93 (2) the last sentence of RCW 63.60.010 
(“regardless of place of domicile or place of domicile at time of 
death”);94 (3) the language in RCW 63.60.020(1) (“regardless of the in-
dividual’s place of domicile, residence, or citizenship at the time of death 
or otherwise”);95 (4) the stipulation in RCW 63.60.030(1)(a) (“regardless 
of whether the law of the domicile of the deceased individual or person-
ality, at the time of death, or thereafter, recognizes a similar or identical 
property right”);96 (5) RCW 63.60.030(1)(b)(iv) (“regardless of whether 
the law of the domicile of the deceased third party, at the time of death, 
or thereafter, recognizes a similar or identical property right”);97 and (6) 
RCW 63.60.020(2) (“regardless of the personality’s place of domicile, 
residence, or citizenship at the time of death or otherwise”).98 
                                                 
 92. Id. at 1135 (citation omitted). 
 93. Id. at 1141. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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1. Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clause Constitutionality 
The court first stated that the Act was unconstitutional under the 
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.99 
The court noted that when it comes to procedural matters, a state may 
apply its own laws even when related substantive issues are governed by 
laws of another state.100 But when deciding the merits of a claim, the 
state must meet a “significant contact” standard.101 This means that the 
choice of the forum state’s law rather than the domicile state’s law can-
not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.102 
In this case, the defendants did not (and, as the court notes, could 
not) show that Washington had sufficient interest in the defendants’ 
property rights to justify applying Washington law to the issue of post-
mortem publicity rights.103 Additionally, the court noted that “[n]ot only 
is Washington’s choice-of-law directive at odds with the almost unani-
mous views of courts that have grappled with the survivability of the 
right of publicity, it also runs contrary to the traditional approach for re-
solving the testamentary or intestate disposition of personal property.”104 
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Constitutionality 
The court also found that the Act was unconstitutional under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.105 The court explained that the Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the 
states.106 Courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to deny states the 
same authority vested in Congress (this interpretation provides the 
“dormant” aspect).107 Thus, states cannot apply their individual statutes 
to commerce that takes place in other states.108 
                                                 
 99. Id. at 1134−35. 
 100. Id. at 1135. 
 101. “[T]o satisfy constitutional requirements, the state ‘must have a significant contact or 
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’” Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
818 (1985)). 
 102. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. 
 103. “With respect to individuals or personalities domiciled in other jurisdictions, however, 
Experience does not even attempt to argue that Washington has sufficient interests in their property 
rights to justify application of Washington law to the issue whether such individuals’ or personali-
ties’ rights of publicity survive their deaths.” Id. at 1135. 
 104. Id. at 1138. 
 105. Id. at 1141−42. 
 106. Id. at 1141. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1142. 
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The court agreed with defendant’s characterization of the WPRA as 
“creating a Washington-centered national right-of-publicity system.”109 
The court saw the WPRA as an attempt by Washington to govern com-
mercial transactions that have no connection at all with Washington, in-
cluding “a variety of transactions occurring ‘wholly outside’ Washing-
ton’s borders, including right-of-publicity transfers between non-
residents via contract, testamentary device, or intestate succession, and 
the creation and dissemination in other forums of advertising incorporat-
ing the names or likenesses of non-domiciliaries.”110 Furthermore, the 
WPRA attempts to govern transfers between out-of-state citizens and to 
control advertising in other areas that incorporates the names and like-
nesses of personalities with no connection to Washington.111 
Accordingly, the court held that, as the WPRA seeks to govern 
commercial transactions occurring outside Washington’s borders, the 
choice-of-law directive in the WPRA violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause.112 The court explicitly found the same provisions of the WPRA 
that it determined were in violation of the Due Process and Full Faith and 
Credit Clauses were additionally unconstitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.113 
C. Policy Against Upholding the WPRA 
The court also noted several policy reasons for striking down the 
WPRA. First, it pointed out that the choice-of-law directive is in opposi-
tion to the traditional approach for dealing with personal property after 
death.114 The court saw this as evidence of the arbitrariness of the WPRA 
amendments.115 
The court went on to explain that enforcing the provisions of the 
WPRA will lead to inconsistent and unjust results.116 As only Washing-
ton and one other state (Indiana) have statutes that disregard the law of 
the domicile, anyone using a deceased personality’s name or likeness 
would be subject to contradictory standards.117 This would create a situa-
tion where defendants would be unable to avoid litigation in Washington, 
                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1143. 
 114. Id. at 1138; MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17 (“The traditional rule, under both the First 
and Second Restatement of Conflicts, for determining the testamentary or intestate disposition of 
personal property is to look to the law of decedent’s domicile at the time of death.”). 
 115. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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as it is not feasible to restrict sales to only states other than Washing-
ton.118 
Furthermore, many plaintiffs would likely be motivated to specifi-
cally divert sales to Washington so that they can take advantage of the 
protections of the WPRA.119 Finally, the court was concerned that, alt-
hough defendants may do everything possible to avoid having any con-
duct in Washington, they would still be subject to the WPRA because 
specific jurisdiction may be based solely on the effects within the forum 
state.120 
The court concluded its policy discussion by emphasizing the im-
portance of the law of domicile to avoid the negative consequences with 
which the court was concerned.121 The court explained that, as a person-
ality can have only one domicile at the time of death, the law of domicile 
is “a constant, based upon which the scope and survivability of any right 
of publicity may be derived.”122 This means that any person using the 
image or likeness of a personality that has passed into the public domain 
does not need to worry about restricting its sales to certain states.123 This 
would also eliminate the incentive for plaintiffs to divert sales to a spe-
cific state to obtain jurisdiction there (“forum shopping”).124 
IV. A PROPOSAL TO PRESERVE PERSONALITY RIGHTS AFTER 
DEATH IN WASHINGTON STATE 
The district court correctly concluded that the Washington Person-
ality Rights Act, when applied, violates the Due Process, Full Faith and 
Credit, and dormant Commerce Clauses. Although the Act as it stands 
today is invalid, it is still important for the right of publicity to be de-
scendible for the protection of celebrities and their families. 
In light of the importance of a descendible right of publicity, this 
Part puts forth the argument that, to avoid the constitutional issues ad-
dressed in Experience Hendrix, the Washington State Legislature should 
make further amendments to the statute. Washington publicity rights 
laws should provide sufficient postmortem protections of publicity rights 
while avoiding the constitutional issues that arose in the Experience 
Hendrix case. 
                                                 
 118. Id. at 1138−39. 
 119. Id. at 1139. 
 120. Id. (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789−91 (1984)). 
 121. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139−40. 
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A. The District Court Was Correct in Its Constitutionality Analysis 
In its holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the 
Supreme Court made clear that state-created publicity rights are not per 
se unconstitutional.125 But unlike Zacchini, many modern right of public-
ity cases center on the use of a celebrity’s likeness in interstate com-
merce.126 As such, far-reaching statutes like the WPRA, while not per se 
unconstitutional, often violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of 
the Constitution. 
As Experience Hendrix involved the use of Jimi Hendrix’s likeness 
in interstate commerce (a Nevada-based corporation selling Hendrix 
memorabilia in stores owned by a New Jersey-based company with loca-
tions throughout the United States), the application of the WPRA to the 
case necessarily elicits constitutional questions. The district court was 
correct in concluding that the WPRA violates the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses, rendering the 2008 WPRA amendments unworka-
ble. 
1. Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.127 
Although civil defendants are not afforded the same strict due process 
protections as criminal defendants, “the basic protection against ‘judg-
ments without notice’ afforded by the Due Process Clause is implicated 
by civil penalties.”128 
The district court correctly concluded that the amended WPRA vio-
lates the Due Process Clause. As noted by Judge Kozinski in his dissent 
in White v. Samsung Electronics, “[t]he broader and more ill-defined one 
state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the legitimate inter-
                                                 
 125. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578−79 (1977) (“We conclude that 
although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of 
this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.”). 
 126. See generally Jeremy T. Marr, Note, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity 
Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863 (2003). 
 127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 128. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.22 (1996) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977)). 
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ests of other states.”129 This interference with the interests of other states 
constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause. 
First, application of the WPRA leads to uncertainty for any busi-
ness that wishes to use the likeness of a celebrity in commerce. Although 
the use may be acceptable under the laws of the state in which the busi-
ness is domiciled, the business may still be subject to punishment in the 
State of Washington. Any such business or individual would not be on 
notice as to which law applies to them, or how they can ensure compli-
ance with the laws. When a business or individual engages in acts that 
are lawful in one state but is then subject to damages in another state, 
there arise concerns about the fair notice requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.130 The WPRA thus violates the “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictat[ing] that a 
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may im-
pose.”131 
Furthermore, the WPRA’s stipulation that Washington publicity 
rights law applies regardless of domicile violates the Due Process 
Clause. The WPRA makes an outright statement that Washington will 
apply its law without taking into account the interest of any other state, 
the appropriateness of applying the laws of another state, or the interests 
of the citizens of other states. This extension of Washington’s reach be-
yond constitutional limitations violates due process limitations by 
“mak[ing] otherwise lawful conduct unlawful.”132 
2. Full Faith and Credit 
Article IV of the Constitution provides that “full faith and credit 
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other state.”133 To determine whether a state’s law vio-
lates the Full Faith and Credit Clause, courts examine “the contacts of 
the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the occur-
rence or transaction giving rise to the litigation.”134 If the court deter-
mines that the state seeking to apply its law “has only an insignificant 
                                                 
 129. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 130. See Hillel Michael Elkins, Note, Take My Likeness, Please: Threats to the Right of Pub-
licity in Light of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1371, 1393 (2005). 
 131. BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 574. 
 132. Elkins, supra note 130, at 1383. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 134. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). 
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contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of 
its law is unconstitutional.”135 
In the instant case, the State of Washington had only limited contact 
with the parties and the occurrence or transaction. The plaintiff was dom-
iciled in Washington, while the defendant was domiciled in Nevada. The 
transaction or occurrence (the sale of Jimi Hendrix-related materials) was 
initiated by a company with its principle place of business in New Jersey. 
Although Jimi Hendrix was born in Washington State, this was not a sig-
nificant contact because he no longer lived in Washington at the time of 
his death (and for several years prior). Thus, the only contact with the 
State of Washington was the plaintiff’s residence. As applying Washing-
ton’s law to a case with so few significant contacts with the state violated 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the court was correct in determining 
that the WPRA could not be applied without violating important consti-
tutional limitations. 
Similar problems will arise in any other case to which the current 
version of the WPRA is applied. Anytime a significant state contact such 
as the location of the decedent’s domicile is ignored by stipulation of 
state law, this will result in applying the law of the state with fewer con-
nections to the case. Giving more weight to the law of a state where the 
celebrity was not domiciled at the time of death therefore results in a vio-
lation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
3. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”136 This amend-
ment, coupled with the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to Congress 
“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes,”137 implies that there is a prohibition 
against individual states creating statutes that burden interstate commerce 
or discriminate against other states. This prohibition is known as the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
The district court was correct in its conclusion that the “regardless 
of domicile” provisions of the WPRA violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a statute has the 
potential to violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it places a substan-
tial burden on interstate commerce when applied to activities that take 
                                                 
 135. Id. at 311. 
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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place across state lines.138 Other federal courts have repeatedly struck 
down state statutes that, when applied, resulted in a Commerce Clause 
violation.139 It therefore stands to reason that a state publicity rights stat-
ute that similarly burdens interstate commerce would be invalid.140 
The amended WPRA falls into this category. The statute explicitly 
states that its provisions universally apply “regardless of whether the law 
of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individual or personality 
at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar or identical proper-
ty right.”141 This stipulation that Washington’s publicity rights law 
should apply to essentially any situation in which there is an accusation 
of infringement of a deceased individual’s rights places an undue burden 
on interstate commerce. 
First, the amendments to the WPRA created a state law that pre-
vents individuals and businesses in other states from engaging in com-
mercial activities that are lawful in their home states. Statutes having this 
effect have been recognized as violating the Commerce Clause by “di-
minish[ing] . . . entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several 
States impose on the conduct of . . . business.”142 
Second, the broad scope of the WPRA has in effect created a na-
tional standard to which advertisers must adhere. Especially with the 
widespread use of Internet advertising, advertisers are forced to either 
create multiple marketing campaigns for different states, or conform to 
the requirements of the WPRA.143 As there is extra expense incurred in 
creating multiple campaigns,144 advertisers are essentially forced to use 
the WPRA as their guideline for any advertisements used nationwide. 
This broad application impermissibly restricts interstate commerce. 
                                                 
 138. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529−30 (1959) (“A State 
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Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence recognizes that state laws 
like the WPRA “violate two [] principles of commerce clause jurispru-
dence: (1) that states cannot directly regulate interstate commerce; and 
(2) that incidental regulations of interstate commerce cannot be excessive 
in light of local interests furthered by the law.”145 As the WPRA violates 
both of these principles, the district court’s conclusion that the WPRA is 
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is in keeping with current 
jurisprudence and was thus accurate. 
B. Justifications for a Descendible Right of Publicity 
There are many reasons why it is important for the right of publicity 
to be descendible. The Eleventh Circuit articulated the first of these rea-
sons: “if the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value 
of the right of publicity during life would be diminished because the ce-
lebrity’s untimely death would seriously impair, if not destroy, the value 
of the right of continued commercial use.”146 
Other courts have put forth several other important reasons. For ex-
ample, the Tennessee Court of Appeals stated that a descendible right of 
publicity promotes an individual’s right to have his or her assets distrib-
uted as specified in a will while protecting the celebrity’s right to pass on 
the value of the personality he or she has created to his or her heirs and 
assigns after death.147 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals went on to explain that allowing 
publicity rights to descend to a celebrity’s heirs prevents the unjust en-
richment of third parties and protects the rights of any licensees who 
have contracted with the celebrity.148 Additionally, as a matter of policy, 
descendible publicity rights further the public interest in counting on the 
truth of representations regarding celebrity sponsorship of goods, as 
“[f]alsely claiming that a living celebrity endorses a product or service 
                                                 
 145. Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 601 F. Supp. 381, 383 (1985) (citing Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982)). 
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violates [Tennessee State Law]. It should likewise be discouraged after a 
celebrity has died.”149 
As it is clearly important to ensure that the right of publicity is de-
scendible, the Washington State Legislature should consider new chang-
es to the WPRA, taking into account the constitutional limitations on the 
current law and narrowing the scope of the WPRA to avoid those limita-
tions. 
C. Proposal for Legislative Changes 
In recent years, many scholars have advocated for a federal right of 
publicity law, citing the need for uniformity across the states. As stated 
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he state of the law is still that 
of a haystack in a hurricane.”150 Adopting a federal right of publicity law 
would address many of the issues with inconsistent state laws and the 
difficulty in determining which law to apply and how to apply it. Advo-
cates hope that “federal legislative action [would] correct the shortcom-
ings of the current scheme, effectively protecting individuals’ property 
rights while simultaneously placing the proper incentives on potential 
plaintiffs and defendants.”151 
A federal law would also help to rectify the constitutional concerns 
addressed by the district court in the Experience Hendrix case. However, 
lawmakers have been reluctant to step in and create legislation that 
would clear up any confusion in the different right of publicity laws 
among the states. 
In light of the continuing lack of a federal law, the Washington 
State Legislature should amend the WPRA to protect a celebrity’s right 
of publicity after the celebrity’s death while staying in line with the limi-
tations of the Constitution. The legislature could narrow the scope of the 
WPRA by requiring a nexus between the commercial use of a celebrity’s 
likeness and the State of Washington. This would allow the heirs of a 
deceased celebrity to enforce their rights while assuaging Due Process, 
Full Faith and Credit, and dormant Commerce Clause concerns. 
Under choice of law principles, the forum state (here, Washington) 
must have a reasonable basis for applying its own law to a case.152 The 
state has a reasonable basis for applying its law only if (1) an event (such 
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 150. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (1956). 
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as creating a contract or completing a transaction) closely connected with 
the cause of action has taken place in the forum state; and (2) applying 
the state’s law would not be unfair to the party opposing the application 
of the law.153 Additionally, the issue must arise from conduct from which 
the opposing party did or could have received some material benefit; or if 
there was no material benefit, it must have been foreseeable that the par-
ty might be subject to the laws of the forum state.154 Applying this three-
part test will satisfy Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns, which all require some form of significant 
state contacts and fairness to survive a constitutional challenge.155 
The first part of the test for whether the state has a reasonable basis 
for applying its law creates a nexus requirement. This requirement en-
sures that the state seeking to apply its own law has sufficient contacts 
with the cause or action to justify the application of its own rules.156 Sim-
ilarly, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine employs a nexus require-
ment.157 Applied mostly in the area of taxation, there is a requirement of 
“some definite link, some minimum connection . . . between a taxing 
state and the person, property, or transaction that the state seeks to 
tax.”158 This limits the authority of the states and prevents states from 
creating regulations that encroach upon Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce.159 
Similarly, incorporating nexus requirements into the WPRA could 
allow the statute to serve its intended purpose of protecting the rights of 
deceased celebrities while avoiding the constitutional problems that con-
cerned the court in the Experience Hendrix case. The Washington State 
Legislature could redraft the statute to require that the defendant’s com-
mercial use of the celebrity’s likeness has sufficient contacts (a “nexus”) 
with Washington State. Sufficient contacts could encompass things like 
advertising in Washington using the celebrity’s likeness, deriving mone-
tary benefit in Washington from the use of the likeness, and engaging in 
activities in Washington from which the defendant expects to receive a 
monetary benefit. 
Under existing dormant Commerce Clause cases, it is fairly easy to 
establish a connection with the forum state for the purposes of fulfilling a 
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nexus requirement.160 Courts have found that many types of activities 
create such a nexus, including occasionally visiting the state, having an 
employee in the state, storing items in the state, and carrying on business 
partially within (in addition to outside) the state.161 Specifically, Wash-
ington courts have found that a nexus existed with the State of Washing-
ton, even when a company had no permanent offices or employees in 
Washington, because the company sent sales representatives to meet with 
Washington customers, a “practice . . . significantly associated with its 
ability to establish and maintain its Washington market.”162 
It would be fairly easy for a Washington plaintiff to establish that a 
defendant’s commercial activities using the likeness of a deceased celeb-
rity had a nexus with the state. Once the nexus requirement is placed in 
the WPRA, a plaintiff could easily show that a defendant had advertised 
in Washington, sent products or materials to Washington, established 
some sort of market in Washington, or derived some monetary benefit 
from Washington citizens. 
For example, in the case at hand, the defendant, 
HendrixLicensing.com “distribute[d] or [sought] to distribute posters, 
fine art prints, apparel, and other novelty items bearing the likeness of, or 
art created by, Jimi Hendrix, accompanied with his name.”163 The com-
pany was located in Las Vegas, Nevada; however, the defendant’s cus-
tomers offered the items for sale at stores in Washington State, including 
Spencer’s Gifts.164 Under a nexus requirement, a court could easily con-
clude that the defendant derived monetary benefit from selling items 
bearing Hendrix’s likeness in Washington, sent its products to Washing-
ton, carried on business in Washington, and acted in ways intended to 
establish or maintain a market for Jimi Hendrix merchandise in Washing-
ton. Thus, under a modified version of the WPRA, Experience Hendrix 
would have been able to recover for damages. At the same time, the 
WPRA would not violate the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and 
dormant Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The right to personality and publicity has changed in many ways 
over the years. It is handled differently across the country, with some 
states having stronger protections than others. Until recently, Washington 
State had some of the strongest personality rights protections for de-
ceased celebrities. But the decision of the district court in Experience 
Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd. effectively eliminated 
some of these protections. 
The district court correctly concluded that the WPRA as amended 
in 2008 violates the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant 
Commerce Clauses. The stipulation that Washington’s publicity rights 
law applies “regardless of domicile” violates the Due Process Clause in 
that it leads to uncertainty as to which state law will apply and fails to 
take into account the interests of any other state. Additionally, the 
WPRA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause by ignoring the signifi-
cant contacts parties may have with others states, which would then 
make the other state’s law more applicable. Finally, the WPRA violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause by overburdening commerce that takes 
place across state lines. 
As celebrities are largely dependent on the moneymaking capabili-
ties of the use of their likenesses, the State of Washington has a strong 
interest in protecting the rights of celebrities and individuals, both during 
life and after death. In light of the absence of a federal law addressing the 
right of publicity, the legislature is left with the option of amending the 
current WPRA. 
To ensure that personality rights continue after death, the Washing-
ton legislature should amend the Washington Personality Rights Act. The 
Act can be amended to protect personality rights after death while re-
maining within constitutional boundaries. To do so, the legislature could 
alter the WPRA to require a significant nexus between the commercial 
use of the celebrity’s likeness and the State of Washington, implicating 
issues of fairness. This would narrow the scope of the law to ensure that 
the Act does not violate the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and 
dormant Commerce Clauses while still allowing heirs to retain a celebri-
ty’s right to publicity after they have passed away. 
 
